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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78-2-2(3)0). By order dated July 18, 2005, the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to its authority found in UCA § 78-2-2(4), transferred this case 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the provisions of UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NUMBER 1 
Did the district court err when it refused to vacate default judgment despite its 
having no jurisdiction over the matter, the Fullingims never having been properly served 
with summons and the Amended Complaint? (Issue preserved: R. 95, 100-106, 178-181) 
Standard of Review 
"A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed 
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is based 
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is 
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom 
it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the 
decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the 
district court." Jackson Constr. Co, v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, | 8, 100 P.3d 1211. 
ISSUE NUMBER 2 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the Fullingims' motion for 
relief from judgment when the district court clerk had entered default judgment in 
4850-1737-8560.FU001.001 3 
violation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure ("URCP") 55(b)(1)? (Issue preserved: R. 95, 
106-107, 181-182.) 
Standard of Review 
The appellate courts "will generally reverse a trial court's denial of a rule 60(b) 
motion only where the court has exceeded its discretion." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, 
Tf7, 104 P.3d 1198. "A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, TJ9, 11 P.3d 277. 
ISSUE NUMBER 3 
Did the district court err by denying the Fullingims' motion for relief from 
judgment based on its conclusion that the Fullingims had not proffered a meritorious 
defense? (Issue preserved: R. 181.) 
Standard of Review 
An appellate court reviews "for correctness the trial court's determination of 
whether a defense is meritorious." Lund v. Brown , 2000 UT 75, If 12, 11 P.3d 277. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
URCP, Rules 4(d), 5(b), 55(b)(1), and 60(b)(1) 
The full text of each of these Rules is appended to this brief at Tab A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in this case on June 2, 2005, 
denying the Fullingims' Motion for Relief from Judgment. 
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THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On September 13, 2002, Plaintiff/Appellee, Smith Springs LLC ("Smith 
Springs"), filed a complaint against the FuUingims in the Second Judicial District Court. 
(R. 1-8.) The district court, on February 12, 2003, ordered this case to "be dismissed, 
without prejudice, for failure to serve [the FuUingims] within 120 days of filing the 
Complaint" pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the URCP. (R. 9.) Twenty-six days later, on March 
10, 2003, six months (less a day) after the original complaint had been filed, Smith 
Springs filed a First Amended Complaint. (R. 11-18.) At the same time, Smith Springs 
also filed a Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail (R. 19-20), and an Affidavit 
of Andrea Dover (R. 21-26.) On March 18, 2003, the district court notified Smith 
Springs's counsel to submit a motion to set aside the dismissal entered on February 12, 
2003. (Docket entry for March 18, 2003. The docket is appended hereto at Tab B.) 
Prompted by this notification, Smith Springs filed on March 21, 2003, an Ex-Parte 
Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint (R. 44-45) with a memorandum in support (R. 
31-34), attaching the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail and the Affidavit 
of Andrea Dover (R. 35-42). 
The district court issued a memorandum decision granting the Motion to Reinstate 
Plaintiffs Complaint and the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail on April 
14, 2003. (R. 48-49.) An Order Granting Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint was 
entered by the district court on May 12, 2003. (R. 52.) On June 10, 2003, the court 
entered an Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by Mail. (R. 54-55). Smith 
Springs submitted what it claimed to be proof of service in compliance with this Order on 
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June 23, 2003. (R. 56.) Based on this certification and the failure of the Fullingims to 
appear, a deputy court clerk on August 20, 2003, signed a Default Certificate. (R. 68). On 
October 3, 2003, a deputy court clerk signed a Default Judgment filed on October 14, 
2003 (R. 77-78), and on November 20, 2003, the court entered an order permitting Smith 
Springs to "turn off the water to the Fullingim's [sic] property," to "require a 
reconnection fee, if and when the Fullingims bring their delinquency current," and to 
"further increase the fees charged for water service" (R. 91-92). 
Because the Fullingims never knew that Smith Springs had filed a complaint 
against them, they never appeared in court prior to the entry of the default judgment. On 
January 10, 2005, the Fullingims filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment, requesting that 
the district court set aside the October 14, 2003, Default Judgment and the Order of 
November 20, 2003. (R. 95-97.) After receiving memoranda from both sides concerning 
the motion, the district court denied the Fullingims' motion in a memorandum decision 
dated April 26, 2005. (R. 187-188.) Following entry of the Order Denying Defendants 
Motion for Relief from Judgment (R. 191), the Fullingims timely filed a notice of appeal 
(R. 194-195). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about March 18, 2002, the Fullingims retained Steven E. Clyde of CLYDE, 
SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON, to represent them in their dispute with Smith Springs over 
the use of a well. (Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde ("Clyde Aff") H 2 (R. 112.)) Mr. Clyde 
informed counsel for Smith Springs by letter, dated March 18, 2002, that he had been 
retained by the Fullingims and that he needed to get familiar with the situation. (Id. at f^ 3. 
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(R. 112, 116.)) Although this letter was sent to Smith Springs's counsel some six months 
before the original complaint was filed in September 2002, it expressly informed Smith 
Springs that Mr. Clyde represented the Fullingims in the very controversy that became 
the subject of the complaint. After about April 3, 2002, Mr. Clyde had no further contact 
with Smith Springs's counsel (Id. at Tf 8. (R. 113)); had he been contacted by Smith 
Springs, however, Mr. Clyde would have contacted his clients, the Fullingims, and 
sought their permission to accept service of process on their behalf. (Id. at f^ 7. (R. 113.)) 
Only after the Default Judgment was entered and the Order was signed did the 
Fullingims learn of the entry of Default Judgment against them. The Fullingims contacted 
Mr. Clyde, to discover whether he had ever been notified of the Complaint. Mr. Clyde 
informed the Fullingims that he had not received any notice about the filing of the 
complaint and was not aware of the complaint even though he had notified David L. 
Knowles, Smith Springs's attorney, that he had been retained by the Fullingims to 
represent them. 
The Fullingims were never personally served with a copy of Summons or the 
Complaint. Nor was service ever obtained on the Fullingims by certified mail. (Affidavit 
of John P. Fullingim ("Fullingim Aff") ffif 10, 11 (R. 118.)) The Fullingims did not 
recall seeing any cards from a deputy sheriff left at their house in Texas. (Id. at If 7.) They 
were not informed that anyone had been trying to serve papers at their Texas residence. 
(Id. at Tj 6.) While away from their Texas residence, certified mail may have been refused 
by the Fullingims' housekeeper or employees who had access to the residence. (Id. at f 
8.) However, in such events the Fullingims expected to be informed of such actions, and 
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they were not informed of any such actions in their absence. (Id. at K 9.) The Fullingims 
did not intentionally avoid service and were unaware that Smith Springs was trying to 
serve them with papers. (Id. at ^ 11.) However, if the Fullingims had been contacted by 
Mr. Clyde, they would have authorized him to accept service of process in this matter. 
( M a t t 12.) 
Despite the fact that Smith Springs's counsel knew the Fullingims had retained 
Utah legal counsel, knew who that counsel was, and had been in contact with their 
counsel prior to the filing of the complaint, Smith Springs never attempted to contact the 
Fullingims5 counsel concerning accepting service of the complaint. (Affidavit of David 
L. Knowles, ^ 6, 10. (R. 139.)) Instead, Smith Springs sought and obtained leave from 
the court to perfect service by alternative means. When it sought to obtain permission for 
service by alternative means, Plaintiff failed to inform the court that it knew the 
Fullingims were represented by Utah legal counsel and had earlier been in contact with 
that counsel prior to the time the complaint was filed. None of the means of service 
attempted by Plaintiff gave the Fullingims actual knowledge of the existence of 
Plaintiffs complaint against them. (Fullingim Aff. ^ 11. (R. 118.)) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court erred in denying the Fullingims' Motion for Relief from 
Judgment. The district court premised its denial upon its conclusion that Smith Springs 
had complied with the reasonable diligence requirements in its attempts to serve the 
Fullingims and that the Fullingims' request was untimely and unsupported by a 
meritorious defense. However, Smith Springs did not act with reasonable diligence. 
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While it made representations that it had attempted to serve the Fullingims several times 
without success, Smith Springs failed to inform the district court that it knew the 
Fullingims were represented by Utah counsel but never attempted to contact their counsel 
to accept service of process. 
The default judgment entered by the district court clerk is void. Smith Springs 
never properly served the Fullingims, who had, as a result, no actual notice that the case 
had been filed against them. Moreover, the default judgment against the Fullingims was 
entered, not by the district court upon application, but by the district court clerk, contrary 
to the express provisions of URCP Rule 55. 
Because the default judgment is void, the Fullingims were not obligated to file its 
Motion for Relief from Judgment within a specified amount of time or present 
meritorious defenses against Smith Springs's claims; if meritorious defenses are required, 
however, the Fullingims' pleadings set out the necessary minimum showing. 
Given these circumstances—that the default judgment is void for lack of service 
and improper entry, and that the meritorious defenses are unnecessary or satisfied—the 
Fullingims submit that the default judgment entered against them must be set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
URCP Rule 60(b) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding" if, among various other possibilities, "the judgment 
is void." URAP Rule 60(b)(4). In the present dispute, the district court's June 1, 2005, 
Order Denying [the Fullingims 'J Motion for Relief from Judgment is, in fact, void as a 
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result of Smith Springs' failure to effect proper service of process as required by URCP 
Rule 4. The district court, evidently believing that Smith Springs had "fully complied 
with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by exercising reasonable diligence and 
good faith in their attempts to serve [the Fullingims]" (R. 191), determined that the 
default judgment entered against the Fullingims "was not void for lack of jurisdiction" 
(id.). This conclusion, however, cannot withstand scrutiny under Utah law, for although 
Smith Springs sought and received permission to serve the Fullingims by alternative 
means, it did not exercise reasonable diligence before resorting to those alternative 
means, nor did it inform the district court of the simple, existing alternative means which 
would have guaranteed actual notice to the Fullingims, i.e., contacting Steven E. Clyde, 
Fullingims Utah counsel. 
The judgment thus obtained by Smith Springs was reared upon the nonexistent 
foundation of improper service, depriving the district court of jurisdiction over the 
Fullingims. Personal jurisdiction being indispensable to the effectiveness of any order 
promulgated by a district court, its lack left the district court in the present matter without 
jurisdiction to enter the default judgment at issue, and this Court must therefore overturn 
the district court's erroneous Order and direct it to grant Fullingims motion for Relief 
from Judgment. 
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— I — 
SMITH SPRINGS FAILED TO EFFECT PROPER SERVICE UPON THE 
FULLINGIMS,4)EPRIVING THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
JURISDICTION AND RENDERING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
VOID. 
A. Jurisdiction Can Exist Only Where the 
Defendant has been Given Some Notice of 
the Pending Action. 
A court can only acquire jurisdiction over the parties through "proper issuance and 
service of summons." Jackson Constr. Co., 2004 UT 89, TflO, 100 P.3d at 1214. Under 
URCP Rule 4, a plaintiff may serve a defendant personally or by certified mail. See 
URCP Rule 4(d)(1)(A) or 4(d)(2)(A). Irrespective of the method used, "[d]ue process of 
law requires that before one can be bound by a judgment affecting his property right, 
some process must be served upon him which in some degree at least is calculated to give 
him notice." Naisbitt v. Herrick, 290 P. 950, 954 (Utah 1930). 
In Naisbitt, the plaintiff sought to quiet title to certain real property in Weber 
County, against known and unknown persons claiming interest in the property. Id. at 951. 
Service upon these various unnamed "persons" was made by publication. Id. After the 
plaintiff obtained a judgment quieting his title to the property, one Theodore Gajewsky 
who was not named in the suit, and who, consequently, had not been personally served 
with a summons, appeared and sought to set the judgment aside. See id. Gajewsky 
asserted that he had been in exclusive possession of the property, was the owner of the 
property, and was entitled to exclusive possession of the property. See id. at 951-52. In its 
ruling, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[d]ue process of law requires that before one 
can be bound by a judgment affecting his property right, some process must be served 
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upon him which in some degree at least is calculated to give him notice." Id. at 954. 
More recently, Utah courts have stated "[a] fundamental requirement of due 
process, as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is 
that notice be given that 'is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.'" Provo River Water Users' Assyn v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 
1993) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that this notice requirement 
is "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which 
is to be accorded finality." Mulane, 339 U.S. at 314. The Court further explained that 
"[t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee 
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315. 
"Whether service of process [is] proper is a jurisdictional issue." Bonneville 
Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Garcia v. Garcia, 712 
P.2d 288, 290 n.4 (Utah 1986)). When "service of summons [is] fatally defective, the 
judgment entered pursuant thereto is without force or effect," Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 
2d 249, 461 P.2d 465, 466 (Utah 1969), because "'[a] lack of [personal jurisdiction] is 
fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with respect to a particular litigant."' Jackson 
Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, \%, 100 P.3d 1211 (quoting State v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted)). Thus, "[w]here there is no service of 
summons," any judgment rendered "is void." State Tax Comm 'n v. Larsen, 100 Utah 103, 
110 P.2d 558, 560 (1941); see also Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 
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382, 385 (Utah App. 1991) ("[A] judgment ... is void ... if the court that rendered it 
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties or if the court acted in a manner 
inconsistent with due process.")(citation omitted; alteration in original); Martin v. Nelson, 
533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975) (Judgment vacated due to lack of jurisdiction based upon 
falsified return of service and insufficient time for filing of answer). 
B. The Fullingims Never Received Proper 
Notice of the Smith Springs Complaint. 
1. The Fullingims were Never Personally 
Served. 
Although Smith Springs presented evidence to the district court that it attempted to 
serve the Fullingims both personally and by certified mail, it nevertheless admits that it 
was unable to perfect service by either method {Affidavit of Andrea Dover {"Dover 
Affidavit"), R. 37-38). Through a note provided by a deputy sheriff in Dallas County, 
Texas, which was attached to the Dover Affidavit, Smith Springs presented evidence that 
between December 9, 2002, and February 14, 2003, eight attempts were made to serve 
papers on the Fullingims (R. 39). According to the deputy sheriffs note, contact was 
made with a lady, who informed the deputy sheriff that the Fullingims were in Utah until 
the middle of January. Additionally, the deputy sheriffs note asserts that he left several 
cards at the door to call him. The deputy sheriffs note concludes with his opinion that the 
Fullingims were avoiding papers. Smith Springs also presented evidence, also attached to 
the Dover Affidavit, that a copy of the complaint sent to the Fullingims by certified mail 
was returned unclaimed (R. 40-42). 
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The Fullingims, however, were not served at all, either personally or by certified 
mail {Affidavit of John P. Fullingim ("Fullingim Affidavit"), R. 117-18). They were in 
Utah during some of the time that the deputy sheriff in Texas was allegedly trying to 
serve them at their Texas address; however, when they returned to Texas they never 
received or saw any cards, contrary to the statement by the Texas process server, and 
were never informed that anyone had been trying to serve papers on them in their absence 
(id., R. 118). During the time that they were in Utah, the Fullingims resided at their house 
across the street from one of the members of Smith Springs, Keith Smith (id., f 5, R. 
118). Smith Springs thus knew or should have known that the Fullingims were in Utah 
and could have been served in Utah at that time.1 
2. Sm ith Springs Never Effected Proper 
Alternative Service upon the Fullingims. 
1
 Smith Springs presented evidence in response to the Fullingims' Motion for 
Relief from Judgment that it did try to serve the Fullingims in Utah. (R. at 033) However, 
this attempt occurred in March, 2003 after the case had been dismissed without prejudice 
and when the Fullingims had already returned to Texas, and the deputy sheriff returned 
the papers to Smith Springs because they were informed by someone at the Fullingim's 
Utah residence that it was a rental and that the Fullingims were in Texas. 
2
 One of the more troubling aspects of this matter is the fact that Smith Springs 
sought permission for alternative service after the case had been dismissed. The trial 
court dismissed Smith Springs' Complaint on February 12, 2003 (R. 9), over 150 days 
after its filing. Smith Springs filed its Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail 
on March 10, 2003, 26 days later. The trial court, despite no longer having jurisdiction 
due to its having dismissed the case, thereupon requested a Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs 
Complaint (a motion for which no provision exists in the URCP), which was filed on 
March 21, 2003, 37 days after the case had been dismissed. The trial court then granted 
both the reinstatement and the alternative-service motions (R. 52-55). 
While it is clear that a trial court may "extend the time for service ..., even if the 
time has expired," State v. Z.F., 2001 UT App 132, No. 20001084-CA, 2001 WL 422947 
(Utah App.), at *2 (April 19, 2001) (unreported, copy attached at Tab C), it is equally 
clear that such an extension must take place before the case is dismissed, Callahan v. 
Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Unless and until a cause of action 
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The Fullingims do not recall ever being sent, or rejecting, certified letters from 
Smith Springs (Fullingim Affidavit Iff 8-10, R. 118), although after obtaining leave to use 
alternative means of service, Smith Springs provided some evidence that it had sent a 
copy of its Complaint by certified mail, which was returned marked "refused" on June 
18, 2003 (R. 40-42). This is immaterial, however, inasmuch as Smith Springs obtained 
leave for alternative service improperly, and failed as well to satisfy the reasonable 
diligence requirement upon which such leave is based. 
Smith Springs' request for permission to serve the Fullingims by alternative means 
(R. 35-36) was improperly based upon a misleading affidavit. According to Rule 
4(d)(4)(A), 
[w]here the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown 
and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon 
all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or 
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is 
avoiding service of process,3 the party seeking service of process may file a 
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by 
publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth 
the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served. 
is dismissed, a party who fails to serve a summons in a timely fashion may preserve the 
action under proper circumstances."). 
Logically, a plaintiff cannot simply begin with "avoiding service of process" 
without having first attempted to locate the proposed defendant "through reasonable 
diligence." In the present case, because Smith Springs never satisfied its duty of 
reasonable diligence, it cannot simply point to what it considers to be avoidance of 
service, which the Fullingims strenuously dispute, to justify its failure to secure proper 
service. See, e.g., Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1276 (Utah 1987) (Pointing out that a 
plaintiff cannot satisfy due process or Rule 4(d) (then Rule 4(f)) by making substitute 
service "without first having shown that diligent efforts have been made to locate the 
defendant"). 
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URCP 4(d)(4)(A). On March 10, 2003, and again on March 21, 2003, Plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail. The Motion was supported by the 
Dover Affidavit, in which Andrea Dover states that service was attempted on the 
Fullingims by certified mail and by personal service. The Affidavit fails to set forth any 
other efforts to locate the Fullingims, such as attempting to discover if they were in living 
at their known address in Utah, across the street from Keith Smith, one of Smith Springs' 
members. The Motion and Affidavit likewise fail to inform the Court that Smith Springs 
knew both that the Fullingims were represented by Mr. Steven E. Clyde of Clyde, Snow, 
Sessions & Swenson, located in Salt Lake City, Utah and that Mr. Clyde had been in 
contact with Smith Springs' counsel {Clyde Affidavit ffl| 3, 5 (R. 112, 113, 116)). These 
fatal flaws invalidate the request and subsequent order for alternative service by 
publication and/or by mail. 
"To meet the reasonable diligence requirement a plaintiff must take advantage of 
readily available sources of relevant information. A plaintiff who focuses on one or two 
sources, while turning a blind eye to the existence of other available sources, falls short 
of this standard." Jackson Construction, 2004 UT 89, at f 20. In Naisbitt {supra), a Mr. 
Gajewsky, who was not a named party and had not been personally served, claimed to be 
in exclusive possession of the property at issue therein, and sought to have judgment 
quieting title set aside. Naisbitt, in whom title had been quieted, however, argued that 
service by publication, which he had effected, sufficed to notify Gajewsky of the action. 
The Supreme Court disagreed: 
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If it be true that [Gajewsky] was in possession of the premises involved in 
this proceeding at the time suit was begun and thereafter, [Naisbitt] may not 
be heard to say that [Gajewsky] was an unknown claimant of the premises 
and thereby secure service of process by publication. 
290 P. at 954. To the contrary, Utah's courts have long championed the responsibility of 
a plaintiff to diligently explore all reasonable options in order to secure service and 
thereby satisfy the demands of constitutional due process. 
In a more recent case, Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), this Court discussed Rule 4's diligence requirement at length. In Bonneville, a 
party had brought a motion for alternative service based on an affidavit identifying 
attempts to serve the defendant and justifying facts. Id. at 770. After default judgment 
was entered, the defendant appeared and showed that the affidavit contained false, 
possibly even intentionally misleading, statements. This Court explained that 
[t]he diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is 
reasonable under the circumstances and not all possible diligence which 
may be conceived. Norf, however J is it that diligence which stops just 
short of the place where if it were continued might reasonably be 
expected to uncover an address ... of the person on whom service is 
sought. There have been cases where [a] plaintiff ... like a person who 
bustles with activity but accomplishes little, makes an imposing recital of 
nonproductive diligence. Such type of "diligence" when probed may reveal 
a design to draw attention away from the fact that a further pursuit might 
result in an unwelcome disclosure of the actual address of the defendant. 
Due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It is 
that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which 
is reasonably calculated to do so. 
Id. at 775 (quoting Parker v. Rossf 117 Utah 417, 427-28, 217 P.2d 373, 379 (Utah 1950) 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added; other citations omitted). "[I]f a 
plaintiff falsely avers or intentionally misleads a court to believe that he or she has 
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exercised such diligence when he or she has not done so," the Bonneville Court 
concluded, "the [trial] court, although at the time appearing to have jurisdiction, never 
had jurisdiction because the plaintiff never met the constitutional mandate." Id. at 773. 
Although Smith Springs admittedly made some efforts to serve the summons on 
the Fullingims in Texas, its flurry of activity, as described by the Bonneville Court, 
amounted to a "bustle[ of] activity ... accomplishing] little," 949 P.2d at 775: an 
"imposing recital of nonproductive diligence" when "further pursuit [would have] 
resulted] in ... the actual address of the defendants]," id. In short, Smith Springs5 
several attempts did not rise to the level of "reasonable diligence" under Utah Law. 
Obviously, "reasonable diligence" does not entail the exhaustion of every conceivable 
possibility to locate and serve a potential defendant, see Bonneville, 949 P.2d at 775; it 
does, however, require that "a plaintiff... take advantage of readily available sources of 
relevant information." Jackson Constr. Co., 2004 UT 89, f20, 100 P.3d at 1217 
(emphasis added). In Jackson, the Utah Supreme Court held that the district court 
erroneously granted a motion for alternative service because the plaintiff in that case did 
not exercise reasonable diligence in seeking to serve process. Id. Tfl[4-5, 24. Though the 
Jackson Construction Opinion dealt more with the location of a valid address, the 
principle of the case is clear: that a plaintiff does not exercise "reasonable diligence" 
when it "turn[s] a blind eye" to a "readily available" method for serving the defendant. 
Id. 
The facts and law of Jackson are plainly analogous to the circumstances of the 
present dispute. Although Smith Springs exhaustively set forth in its supporting 
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Affidavits various attempts at service, it gave no acceptable reason for having "turn[ed] a 
blind eye" to the "readily available" method of contacting the Fullingims' Utah attorney, 
Steven E. Clyde. According to URCP Rule 5(b)(1), "[w]henever under these rules service 
is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service 
shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court." 
Smith Springs knew that the Fullingims were represented by Steven Clyde (see R. 116), 
on this very matter but it made no attempt to contact him, or inform him that a complaint 
had been filed against his clients. 
Smith Springs asserted before the district court that "[i]n good faith, [Smith 
Springs] had no reason to believe that service on the attorney would have been 
successful." (R. 129.) To the contrary, however, Smith Springs' attorney had already 
contacted Mr. Clyde (the Fullingims' counsel at the time) about this dispute prior to 
commencing litigation. And Mr. Clyde had immediately responded and left a message 
with Smith Springs' counsel the very next day (R. 139). There is no indication that 
further contact with Mr. Clyde would have resulted in any less prompt response. 
Smith Springs had a clear avenue of process calculated to give the Fullingims 
actual notice—service upon the Fullingims' legal counsel, who had already contacted 
Smith Springs' counsel, stating that he was representing the Fullingims in this matter. 
Instead of informing the Court of this potential method of service, however, Smith 
Springs instead intimated to the Court that there were no other avenues of service 
available and obtained an order permitting service by publication and/or by mail. 
Mr. Clyde's affidavit makes abundantly clear both that "[i]t is [his] habitual 
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practice to accept service of process from opposing counsel on behalf of my clients to 
avoid the necessity of service of process" and that "if [he] had been contacted by [Smith 
Springs'] counsel, [he] would have sought [the Fullingims'] permission to accept service 
of process of their behalf." (Clyde Affidavit [^f 6 & 7, R. 113.) At the very least, 
contacting Mr. Clyde would have given the Fullingims actual knowledge of the lawsuit, 
something they never received until after the default was entered. Certainly, "ordinary 
prudence" should have prompted Smith Springs to contact Mr. Clyde in an effort to serve 
the Fullingims. At the very least, Plaintiff should have disclosed to the Court the 
existence of this potential avenue of service before seeking alternative service.4 
C. Conclusion to Part I. 
Although Smith Springs demonstrated an inability to serve the Fullingims by mail 
or by personal service, it failed to inform the district court (a) that it knew the Fullingims 
had retained local counsel for this very matter, (b) that it had made no effort to contact or 
submit service to that counsel, or (c) that it had not attempted to serve the Fullingims 
while they were in Utah. Because Smith Springs obtained of the district court leave to 
undertake alternative service while withholding this key information, the district court 
permitted alternative service when it should not have. As a result, the Fullingims were 
never properly served, and the district court never had personal jurisdiction over the 
4
 Incidentally, the alternative method of service selected by Plaintiff cannot be said 
to be "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the 
action" as required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(4)(B). Plaintiff had 
already tried a substantially similar method without success. The alternative service in 
this case is analogous to Jackson Construction where the publication was in Washington 
County rather than at the defendants' last known address. Ultimately, allowing service by 
mail amounted to unlawfully waiving the Fullingims' Due Process rights. 
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Fullingims. Therefore, the default judgment entered by the clerk on October 14, 2003, is 
void, and must be vacated. 
— II — 
T H E UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY A 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF 
URCP RULE 55, RENDERS THAT JUDGMENT VOID. 
In addition to its other fatal flaws—and sufficient in itself to invalidate it—the 
October 2003 Default Judgment was entered, not by the district court, as prescribed by 
URCP Rule 55, but by a deputy court clerk. According to URCP Rule 55, a clerk may 
enter a default judgment only in certain quite limited and well-defined circumstances. 
Those circumstances are not present in this case, and the default judgment is, as a result, 
void and unenforceable. 
URCP Rule 55 specifies that 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows: ... Upon request of the 
plaintiff the clerk shall enter [default] judgment for the amount claimed and 
costs against the defendant if 
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that 
can be made certain by computation. 
URCP Rule 55(b)(1) (emphasis added). "In all other cases'' the rule requires "the party 
entitled to a judgment by default [to] apply to the court therefor." URCP Rule 55(b)(2) 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, the court clerk had no authority to enter default judgment because the 
5
 Jurisdiction can be raised at any time. State Tax Comm'n v. Larsen, 100 Utah 
103, 110P.2d558,560(1941) 
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conditions of the rule were not satisfied: the Fullingims were not "personally served 
pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)," as required by rule 55(b)(1)(C). Unable to obtain personal 
service, Smith Springs sought leave of the Court to effect alternative service. Alternative 
service is not the personal service rule 55(b)(1)(C) calls for. And absent the required 
personal service, authority for the clerk to enter default judgment did not exist. As has 
been noted by other courts, court clerks possess 'Very limited jurisdiction to enter 
judgments in civil actions." Boone v. Sparrow, 70 S.E.2d 204, 209 (N.C. 1952). In 
Boone, the court determined that the court clerk "was without authority to sign a default 
judgment." Id. The court held that "a judgment entered by a clerk ... in a case not 
specified by statute ... is void and of no effect." Id. at 210. Federal courts have also noted 
that "Rule 55 empowers the clerk to enter a default judgment at the request of the 
plaintiff," upon satisfaction of all the conditions of the rule, Combs v. Coal & Mineral 
Mgmt Servs., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1984), reducing the clerk's entry of 
judgment to a "purely ... ministerial act." Id. 
Utah Courts have themselves long recognized the judicial/ministerial distinction 
between court and clerk now memorialized in Rule 55(b). As far back as 1874, in 
Nounnan v. Toponce, 1 Utah 168 (Utah Territory 1874), the Utah Territorial Court 
overturned a clerk's entry of default judgment due to the nonsatisfaction of certain 
limited, prescribed conditions: 
[I]n cases coming under the first subdivision of section 151 of the Practice 
Act, and where it does not require the proof of any fact, [a clerk] may [enter 
judgment on default].... [IJn doing this the Clerk acts ministerially and not 
judicially.... [But] the case made by the [present] complaint is not one in 
which the Clerk would be authorized to enter up judgment on default in 
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vacation. 
Id. (emphasis added) (A copy of this case is attached at Tab D). More recently, in Russell 
v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), another case involving a clerk's improper entry of 
default judgment, the Utah Supreme Court, in light of the defendant's indifference, lack 
of diligence, and noncompliance with applicable rules, upheld the district court's denial 
of relief from his default, id. at 1195, but reversed the clerk's entry of default judgment. 
Courts are not at liberty[, instructed the Court,] to deviate from th[e] rules 
just because one party is in default and is not entitled to be heard on the 
merits of the case. For example, ... Rule 55(b)(2) ... provides that when the 
plaintiffs claim is for other than a sum certain or an amount that by 
computation can be made certain judgment by default may not be entered 
by the clerk of the court, but must be entered by the court.... 
Id. Because all of the conditions listed in URCP Rule 55(b) were not met, the Court 
concluded "that the judgment against Mills must be reversed ...." Id.\ see also Skanchy v. 
Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) ("A clerk of the court may enter a 
default judgment if a defendant defaults and if the complaint seeks damages for a 'sum 
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain.' However, if the 
damages claimed are unliquidated, a default judgment can be entered only by a judge.") 
In the present case, as in Nounnan and Martell (and Skanchy), a critical element 
necessary for the court clerk to enter default judgment was missing when default 
judgment was entered. Under Utah law, the district court clerk is empowered to enter 
default judgment only if "the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(1)" and the other three Rule 55 conditions are met. URCP Rule 55(b)(1). The 
Fullingims, of course, were never personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1), and the 
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deputy court clerk consequently had no authority to enter default judgment. According to 
the plain language of the rule, only the district court itself could have entered default 
judgment. This court must therefore grant the FuUingims relief from void default 
judgment of October 3, 2003. 
Smith Springs's claim that this Court should overlook the court clerk's 
unauthorized entry of judgment as "harmless error" (R. 131-32), actually undermines the 
purpose of Rule 55. The drafters of the rule limited the power of the clerk advisedly, 
evidently apprehending the potential injustice of a clerk entering default judgment against 
a party who had never been "personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)," Rule 
55(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added).6 In such a circumstance, the drafters determined that the 
district court should directly review a motion for entry of default judgment. See Rule 
55(b)(2). Given the opportunity to undertake such a review, the district court might have 
realized, and ruled, that service by mail was not "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise the 
[FuUingims] of the pendency of the action." See Rule 4(d)(4)(B). 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has further stated that "[generally, courts should 
be liberal in granting relief against default judgment so that cases may be tried on the 
merits." Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994). 
Given this injunction to liberality, and because the default judgment was entered by the 
district court deputy clerk in plain violation of applicable law, the default judgment must 
be set aside and the case tried on the merits. 
6
 Note that Rule 55(b) explicitly calls for personal service. The service by 
publication, upon which Smith Springs relies is "Other service" under Rule 4(d)(4), and 
cannot satisfy the personal service mandated by Rule 55(b). 
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— Ill — 
RULE 60(B) 'S TIMELINESS AND MERITORIOUS-DEFENSE 
REQUIREMENTS DID NOT APPLY TO THE FULLINGIMS' MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. 
Under certain circumstances, to successfully move for relief from judgment under 
URCP Rule 60(b) entails satisfaction of the Rule's timeliness limitations ("The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 
months after the ... order ... was entered") and the judicial requirement that the moving 
party "'show' that he or she 'has a meritorious defense to the action," that is, "a clear and 
specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by 
the claimant...," Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ffl[28-29, 11 P.3d 277 (quoting State ex rel 
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselrnan, 667 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1983)) (quotation marks 
omitted); Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1148. 
The district court based its denial of the Fullingims' motion for relief in part upon 
its determinations that the Fullingims "failed to file request for relief from judgment 
within the allotted 3 month period" and "failed to proffer a meritorious defense that 
would justify a trial on the issues raised" (R. 191). The district court erred greatly on 
these two points, however, since, where a 60(b) motion is based upon a judgment's being 
void for lack of personal jurisdiction, such requirements do not pertain. 
In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986), Mrs. Garcia obtained a divorce 
while Mr. Garcia was in Prison. Service was made upon "Mr. Johnson, head of State 
Prison personnel office." 712 P.2d at 289. A default judgment was entered on March 14, 
1973, which Mr. Johnson challenged ten years later in 1983, after his release, asserting 
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under Rule 60(b) that he had never been properly served. The district court denied relief, 
but the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Holding the "attempted service on [Mr. Garcia] ... 
fatally defective," id. at 290, the Court explained that "where [a] judgment is void 
because of a fatally defective service of process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have 
no application" id. (citing Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249, 461 P.2d 465 (1969)) 
(emphasis added): 
[Tjhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The [three-
month] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly 
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made within a 
"reasonable time" ... cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. 
A void judgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on the part of 
the judgment debtor. 
Id. at 290-91 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862). 
"Nor is there," the Court continued, "any requirement, as there usually is when 
default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the moving party show that he has a 
meritorious defense. Either a judgment is void or it is valid" Id. at 291 (quoting Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862 ("FPP") (emphasis added). 
And, since a void judgment has by definition no validity, "[t]here is no question of 
discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4)." Id. at 290 
(quoting FPP); Jackson Constr., 2004 UT 89, at f8. A district court must undertake the 
required analysis regardless of elapsed time or potential merit. "Determining which it is 
[void or valid] may well present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, 
the court must act accordingly." Id. at 291 (quoting FPP). A void judgment must be set 
aside, again, without regard to how long it has been since the judgment in question was 
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rendered or the perceived merit or meritlessness in the eyes of the district court judge. 
Ultimately, if failure of proper service deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enter 
the default judgment (even assuming the district court, not a deputy clerk, properly 
entered the judgment), that judgment must now be set aside regardless of any other fact. 
As the district court clearly erred by applying inapplicable requirements, this 
Court, therefore, should set aside the default judgment entered against the Fullingims. 
The default judgment is void for lack of effective service, and there is neither a time limit 
nor a meritorious defense requirement to set aside a void judgment. Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding" if "the judgment is void." URCP Rule 60(b)(4). The Utah Supreme Court 
has further stated that "[generally, courts should be liberal in granting relief against 
default judgment so that cases may be tried on the merits. Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. 
CONCLUSION 
7 
Should this Court somehow determine that there is a "meritorious defense" 
requirement in the present matter, the Fullingim explained its defenses in their Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment, which was filed with the 
trial court on February 23, 2005, asserting that no contractual arrangement existed to 
obligate them to pay Smith Springs for water service and that they held their own water 
rights to withdraw water pursuant to a contract with Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District. (R. at 181.) Although the Fullingims provided minimal information for their 
defenses, the information is sufficient to meet that minimal burden under Erickson, 882 
P.2d at 1149: "A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside 
if it is entitled to be tried." See also Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 
P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976) overruled in part on other grounds by Mgmt. Servs. v. Dev. 
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980) ("[0]ne who seeks to vacate a default judgment must 
proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the 
issue thus raised."). 
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Smith Springs knew that the FuUingims had retained local counsel specifically to 
deal with the dispute that became the subject of Smith Springs' complaint. However, 
Smith Springs made no attempt to contact the FuUingims' counsel and did not disclose its 
knowledge to the district court. By turning a blind eye to this readily available option, 
Smith Springs failed to fulfill the "reasonable diligence requirement," and should not 
have been granted leave to use alternative service. By these actions, the district court's 
jurisdiction was improperly invoked, and the Default Judgment should be set aside as 
void. In addition, the Default Judgment is void because it was entered by the deputy court 
clerk, exceeding the boundaries of the clerk's limited authority. For these reasons, the 
FuUingims respectfully request this Court to overturn the district court's denial of their 
Motion for Relief from Judgment and direct the district court to enter an order setting 
aside the Default Judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 7j\ clay of April, 2006. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
J. Craj£ 
-SctSftM 
R. Christopher Preston 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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Tab A 
Rule 4. Process. 
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and complaint 
shall be by one of the following methods: 
(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any state or 
judicial district of the United States by the sheriff or constable or by the deputy of either, 
by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of 
age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. If the 
person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if 
the person serving the same shall state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy 
thereof. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or (D) 
below, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the individual 
personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a 
copy of the summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law 
to receive service of process; 
(d)(1)(B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or 
guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care and 
control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is 
employed; 
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or incapable of 
conducting the person's own affairs, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed 
and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody 
or control of the person; 
(d)(1)(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state 
or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be 
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to 
be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process 
to the individual served; 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or 
upon an unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general 
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agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process 
and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, 
by also mailing a copy of the summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such 
officer or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or 
holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or 
does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office 
or place of business; 
(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the summons and 
the complaint to the recorder; 
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the 
county clerk of such county; 
(d)(1)(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(d)(l)(I) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the summons and 
the complaint to the president or secretary of its board; 
(d)(l)(J) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be brought 
against the state, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the attorney 
general and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and 
(d)(l)(K) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public board, 
commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or 
secretary. 
(d)(2) Service by mail or commercial courier service. 
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other than one 
covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(B) or (d)(1)(C) by mail or commercial courier service in 
any state or judicial district of the United States provided the defendant signs a document 
indicating receipt. 
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered by 
paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)(l)(I) by mail or commercial courier service in any state 
or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt. 
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on the date the 
receipt is signed as provided by this rule. 
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(d)(3) Service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows: 
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such 
as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents; 
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable 
international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is reasonably 
calculated to give notice: 
(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that 
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; 
(d)(3)(B)(ii) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter 
of request; or 
(d)(3)(B)(iii) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery to the 
individual personally of a copy of the summons and the complaint or by any form of mail 
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the 
party to be served; or 
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by 
the court. 
(d)(4) Other service. 
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and 
cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the 
individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or where there exists good 
cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party 
seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order 
allowing service by publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall 
set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the 
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. 
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by publication 
or by other means, provided that the means of notice employed shall be reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency 
of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The court's order shall also 
specify the content of the process to be served and the event or events as of which service 
shall be deemed complete. Unless service is by publication, a copy of the court's order 
shall be served upon the defendant with the process specified by the court. 
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(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the court shall, 
upon the request of the party applying for publication, designate the newspaper in which 
publication shall be made. The newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and shall be 
published in the English language. 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a 
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless 
service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party 
shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if 
no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. 
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the 
party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge thereof; or, if 
there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is 
closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein; or, if consented to in writing by the person to be served, delivering a copy by 
electronic or other means. 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of a 
hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, service 
shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by electronic means is 
complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal business hours at 
the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on the next business day. 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the 
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if : 
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made 
certain by computation. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply 
to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into 
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effect. it is neeesNaiv to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the trutl ol any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of an> 
, the court may enndud MK-1; hearings or order such references as it deems 
md proper. 
aside defaui.. r or gout' \.w tii^ ~> ».;. ..iu\ ->CL abide ai, u;u^ 
if a judgment by defa LAIC HCtk3 VJ wen entered, ma\ likewise set il aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b). 
'hiniiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply 
ty entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, 
has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by 
default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default i l 
be entered against the state of T Jtah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
II ule 60 II elief fi Dm ju dgm ent a it • a i dei 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record. 
and errors Ihercu* arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any; as the 
* orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before 
^al is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
w%
 corrected with leave of the appellate court 
(b) s; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, cic < • 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice rel ieu 
• iv rt\ or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
inwing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
%
. covered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
-• * e for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
H ar extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
uh M.Mii is \oiii, i5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
•Mil upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
:! : : s not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
<er of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
ji .• igr / = iri l : order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. * uc 
p : • : • : • i t : for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
th = se i ules or by an independent action. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMITH SPRINGS LLC vs. KRISTIN E FULLINGIM 
<\SE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights 
JRRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
PARLEY R. BAI ,DWIN 
ARTiHiJ 
Plaintiff - SMITH SPRINGS LLC 
SLC, UT 841 01 
Defendant - KRISTIN El E I JLI .INGIM 
DALLAS, TX 75248 
Represented by; J.. CRAIG SMITH 
Defendant - JOHN P FULLINGIM 
DALLAS, TX 7 5248 
Represented by: J. CRAIG SMITH 
XOiJNI SUMMARY 
TOTAI i REVENUE .Amount Due : 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
BA11 /CAS H BONDS Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Refunded: 
Balance: 
2 7 0.00 
270.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300 00 
REVENUE DETAIL TYPE: COMPLAINT 0K-2K 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
45, 
45, 
0, 
0. 
0, 
0, 
0, 
0, 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.50 
.50 
.00 
.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 13 .00 
tp://168.177.211 52/casesearch /CaseSearch?action= :casel list 4 13/2006 
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:ASE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
REVENUE 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
FEE 
FEE 
DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
FEE 
11.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.00 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
205.00 
205.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.50 
5.50 
0.00 
0.00 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Civil, Mi 
Posted By: J. CRAIG SMITH 
Posted: 300.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Refunded: 0.00 
Balance: 300.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
09-13-02 Case filed 
09-13-02 Judge BALDWIN assigned. 
09-13-02 Filed: Complaint 
09-13-02 Fee Account created 
09-13-02 COMPLAINT 0K-2K 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 0K-2K 
02-12-03 Notice - Order of Dismissal for Case 020906507 
Based on a review of this file and Rule 4(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court orders this case be dismissed, without 
Total Due: 
Payment Received: 
45.00 
45.00 
Printed: 04/13/06 16:13:47 Page 2 
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Page 3 of 5 
prejudice, for failure to serve the defendant withii I 12 0 days of 
filing the Complaint. 
2-12-03 Case Disposition is Dismissed debbiel 
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R. BALDWIN debbiel 
2-12-03 Filed order: Order of Dismissal 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed February 12, 2003 
3-10-03 Filed: First amended complaint 
3-10-03 Filed: Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail 
3-10-03 Note: Rec'd Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by 
Mail 
3-10-03 Filed: Affidav it of Andrea Dovei • 
3-17-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
3-18-03 Note: Dana Farmer is notified to submit a motion to set aside 
dismissal. 
3-21-03 Filed: Notice to Submit on Ex-Parte Motion to Reinstate 
Plaintiff's Comp1a int and Mot ion f o Serve by Pub1icat ion and/or 
by Mail 
3-21-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion. to Reinstate P1 aintif f ' s 
Complaint 
3-21-03 Filed: Ex-Parte Motion to Reinstate P l a i n t i f f s Complaint 
3-21-03 Filed: Motion for Service by Publicatii on and/or by Ma: 1 
3-21-03 Filed: Affidavit of Andrea Dover 
3-24-03 Tracking started for Under advisement, Review date May 23, 
2003. 
3-28-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
5-15-03 Fi ] ed order: Memorandum Decis:i on 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed April 14, 2003 
2-15-03 Filed order: Memorandum Decision 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed April 14, 2003 
5-15-03 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
1-21-03 Note: Rec'd Order Granting Motion to Reinstate Plaintiff's 
Complaint 
3-06-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
3-14-03 Filed order: Order G r a. n. 1: :i i I g M : 1: :i : i I 1: : R e i n s t a. t e PI a i n t i f f ' s 
Complaint 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed May 12, 2003 
5-0 6-03 Note: Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by mail 
placed in Judge PRB's basket for signature with file. 
5-10-03 Filed order: Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by 
Mai I 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed June 09, 2003 
5-25-03 Filed: Proof of Service 
J-20-03 Filed: Cost: memo 
1-2 0-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte 
:inted: 04/13/06 16:13:47 Page 3 
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)8-20-03 Issued: Default Certificate 
Clerk harrietb 
)8-20-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020906507 ID 8199012 
We are unable to enter the default judgment/certificate in this 
case for the following reasons: 
Notes: We do not have any service of process in the file. 
Apparently you served by mail. You can not charge the defendant for 
postage, except the certification fee. Amended Complaint states 
principal to be $900, but the Judgment shows $960. Successor 
Agreem1t? 
Dated this day of , 20_ 
District Court Clerk 
L0-03-03 Filed: (Amended) Cost memo 
LO-14-03 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: SMITH SPRINGS LLC 
Debtor: JOHN P FULLINGIM 
Debtor: KRISTIN E FULLINGIM 
1,587.84 Total Judgment 
1,587.84 Judgment Grand Total 
L0-14-03 Filed judgment: Default Judgment/3.41% Per Annum 
Clerk harrietb 
Signed October 03, 2003 
LO-15-03 Case Disposition is Judgment lorenaa 
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R. BALDWIN lorenaa 
L0-29-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.50 
LO-29-03 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.50 
Ll-04-03 Note: Rec'd Order 
Ll-04-03 Filed: First Amended Complaint 
Ll-12-03 Note: file sent to PRB 
Ll-20-03 Filed order: Order 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed November 17, 2003 
L2-05-03 Filed: Notice of withdrawal , as counsel - Dana T Famer for 
Smith Springs lie 
10-29-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 11.00 
L0-29-04 COPY FEE Payment Received: 11.00 
11-01-04 Filed: Notice of Appearance- Atty Hartvigsen- John Fullingim 
11-01-04 Filed: Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
31-11-05 Filed: Motion for relief from judgment 
01-11-05 Filed: Memo in support of motion for relief from judgment 
Printed: 04/13/06 16:13:48 Page 4 
CASE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights 
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1-11-05 Filed: Affidavit of John P Fullingim 
1-11-05 Filed: Affidavit of Steven E Clyde 
1-31-05 Fee Account created Total Due. 2.. 00 
1-31-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.00 
2-10-05 Filed: Memorandum, in opposition to defendants motion for relief 
from judgment 
2-23-05 Exiled: RepJ y TmnnorHndum in :;u(>jx»it nil nrnl ion |ni N'lief from 
judgment 
2-24-05 Filed: Request to Submit Defendant" :i "Motion 1 OJ Holier from 
Judgment" for Decision 
2-25-05 Tracking started for Under advisement,. Review date Apr 26, 
2005, 
4-26-05 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
4-2 6-05 Filed order: Memorandum Decision 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed April 26, 2005 
5-09-05 Note: Received, Order D e n y :i n g D e f e n d a i I 1: s I: 3 o t:„ ,:i :) i I f o r I i e J :ii e f f r o in 
Judgment 
5-16-05 Note: FILE TO PRB 
5-24-05 Note: Order held waiting for mailing certificate. 
5-27-05 Filed: Letter, with attached Certificate of Mailing 
5-02-05 Filed order: Order Denying Defendants Motion for Re1 ;- * • 
Judgment 
Judge pbaldwin 
Signed June 01, 2005 
5-07-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 3 0 0 
5-07-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 
"OPY FEE, Faxed copies (included with another case) 
7-05-05 Fiieu: Notice of Appeal 
7-05-05 Filed: CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS NOT REQUIRED 
7-05-05 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
7-05-05 Filed: NOTICE OF FILING COST BOND ON 1 uE E EAL 
7-12-05 Fee Account created. Total Due: 205.00 
7-12-05 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL, Mail Payment; 
7-12-05 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
7-12-05 Note: COST BOND 
7-12-05 Bond, Posted Payment Received: 300.00 
Note: COST BOND, Mail Payment; 
7-20-05 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court 
3-11-05 Filed: Letter from the Utah Court of Appeals #20050621 
)-23-05 Fee Account created. Total Due: 5 50 
a-23-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 5 50 
rinted: 04/13/06 16:13:48 Page 5 (last) 
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 422947 (Utah App.), 
(Cite as: 2001 WI • 422947 (Utah A pp )) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
STA IE of Utah, Division of Child and IMIIJ::;. 
Services, Respondent and Appellant, 
v. 
Z.F., Petitioner and Appenee. 
No. 20001084-CA. 
\p.» - 9 . 2 0 0 1 . 
Mark L. Shurtlefl. Carv! L. Verdoia, and Jeffrey S. 
Buckner , SaltLak* '* " r ^ » n « . n , ^ L 
Douglas J. Parry and Jennifer i , i .ange, Salt Lake 
("n\ ffn .ippellee 
Heioie • i R H ; N \ \ m - ... . - I, < in< I OR I IE. 
JJ. 
PER CI J RIAM. 
"! I'h-- Division of Child ar.J i";tmi!\ Service-
(DCFS) appeals from an order (1) dismissing / f 
complaint seeking judicial review oil inform..: 
agency action and (2) transferring the case io the 
juvenile court. The case is before this court oi. 
Z.F.'s motion for summary dismissal, on DCiS^ 
motion for partial summary reversal, and on / I 
motions to strike l ^ 1 ^ ' m *M . ^  -i«, i ; i. .—i. 
We deny both motions v -~+;~~ 
for partial summary reve ^ . _ 
10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
the reply memorandum was allowed under Rule 23 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We also 
deny Z.F.'s motion to dismiss the appeal because we 
conclude that the order dismissing the case and 
transferring it to juvenile court was final and 
appealable. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
I IT App 132 
DCFS seeks partial reversal of the district coin t's 
order, which would preserve the dismissal, but 
reverse the transfer. If the DCFS motion is granted, 
the effect would be to leave dismissal as the 
disposition in district court contrary to the intent of 
that court. We agree that the district court could not 
simultaneously dismiss the case, and transfer it to 
the juvenile court. However, based upon :n it 
determination that the district court had subje ct 
matter jurisdiction and erred in both the dismissal 
and the transfer, we reverse the order and remand 
for further proceedings in district court. 
Z.r. nled a timely compia , 
seeking judicial review of it, y action 
At that time, Utah Code Ann. $ o3-46b-15; < 
(1997) gave the district court jurisdiction "to review 
by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting 
from informal adjudicative proceedings," with the 
exception that the juvenile court had jurisdiction in 
actions relating to removal or placement of children 
in state custody or the support of those children. 
The agency decision advised Z.F. that he could seek 
judicial review in the district court. An amendment 
to the statute, effective May 3, 1999, gave the 
juvenile court jurisdiction to review actions relating 
to "substantiated findings of abuse or neglect 
pursuant to [Utah Code Ann. § ] 62A-4a-116.5." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(l)(a)(iii) (Supp.2000). 
DCFS argued that the district court automatically 
lost jurisdiction over Z.F.'s complaint, although it 
was filed roughly one month before the 
amendment's effective date. I he Utah Supreme 
Court rejected a similar argument, in National Parks 
& Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1993), holding that the statute in 
effect when a petition seeking judicial review of 
agency action was filed established the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 912. The court 
concluded that n[o]nce a court has acquired 
jurisdiction of a case, jurisdiction is not 
extinguished by subsequent legislative action" ai id 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 2 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 422947 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 132 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 422947 (Utah App.)) 
an amendment to its jurisdictional statute "did not 
divest this Court of jurisdiction over this case 
because jurisdiction attached under the statute in 
effect when the petition for review was filed." Id. 
DCFS's reliance on Department of Social Services 
v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982), is misplaced. 
Higgs distinguished cases where a complaint was 
filed after the effective date of the repealed 
jurisdictional provision, as in Higgs, from cases 
where a complaint was filed before the effective 
date of the amendment, as in the present case. See 
id. at 1001. Accordingly, the court stated that "once 
a reviewing court's jurisdiction had attached in a 
case, an action repealing the jurisdiction of the 
court in question was not intended to divest that 
court of jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Industrial 
Comm'n v. Agee, 56 Utah 63, 189 P.2d 414 (1920)). 
Under well-settled law, the district court was not 
divested of jurisdiction on the effective date of the 
amendment, and DCFS's argument did not support 
dismissal of Z.F.'s complaint. 
*2 DCFS argues that even if the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction under the statute in effect 
when the complaint was filed, its jurisdiction 
terminated when Z.F. failed to serve the complaint 
on DCFS within 120 days. See Utah R.Civ.P. 4(a). 
Although Rule 4(a) states that an action shall be 
dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to timely 
serve a summons and complaint, the court may 
extend the time for service under Rule 6(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even if the time has 
expired. See Callahan v. Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259, 
1262 (Utah Ct.App.1994). "Unless and until a cause 
of action is dismissed, a party who fails to serve a 
summons in a timely fashion may preserve the 
action under proper circumstances." Id. The trial 
court granted Z.F.'s motion to extend time for 
service, without objection by DCFS. Two months 
later, DCFS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, which collaterally attacked the earlier 
ruling by arguing that the complaint should be 
dismissed for failure to perfect service within 120 
days and that the district court could not extend the 
time for service. 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the case and could grant an extension of the 
time to serve the defendants based upon a finding of 
good cause and excusable neglect. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 6(b). The district court's excusable neglect 
"inquiry is fundamentally equitable in nature and 
entails broad discretion." Serrato v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 2000 UT App 299, & para; 10, 414 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 43. There is no evidence of bad faith; the 
delay in service was not extensive; upon discovery 
that his original counsel had not served the 
complaint, Z.F. and substitute counsel acted 
diligently to accomplish service. There appears to 
be no prejudice to DCFS, other than being required 
to respond to the merits of the complaint. See id. at 
& para;9. In contrast, dismissal of the complaint, 
coupled with the expiration of the time for seeking 
judicial review, would deny Z.F. the opportunity for 
judicial review. 
Finally, we conclude the district court could not 
transfer the pending case to the juvenile court for 
determination. The district court's authority to 
certify issues to the juvenile court is limited to 
questions of "support, custody, and visitation" 
where a petition involving the same minor is 
pending in juvenile court or the juvenile court has 
previously acquired continuing jurisdiction over the 
minor. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-105(3)(b) 
(Supp.2000). A complaint seeking judicial review 
of the substantiated finding that Z.F. was 
"substantially responsible" for child abuse is not 
within this transfer provision. Because the district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
complaint, it should have retained the case for 
determination on the merits. 
We reverse the order dismissing and transferring 
the case, and remand to the district court for further 
proceedings on the merits of the complaint. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 422947 (Utah 
App.), 2001 UT App 132 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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1 Utah 168 Pagel 
1 Utah 168, 1874 WL 12240 (Utah Terr) 
(Cite as: 1874 WL 12240 (I Jtah Tei i )) 
C personal VJ\ICC, «.:. un:v : : ,..;•> u..., . ...^ 
Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah. expired, tin* Respondent took judgment in the 
1
 \MF.S H N >^J ! N \ ^ N Respondent, Clerk's office by default. 
ALLXANOhk iOPONCI-:. Appellant. 
May Term, 1874, 
West Headnotes 
judgment €=>126(1) 
228k 126(1) Most Cited Cases 
Where an action sounds in tort, and the complaint 
does not furnish the measure of damages, but leaves 
the question open for proof, the clerk of the court 
cannot enter a judgment by default, and a judgment 
so entered is a nullity, 
I I lost Cited Cases 
) a judgment by default, the clerk acts 
Judgment €=>143(16) 
228kl43(16) Most Cited Cases 
On a motion to set aside default and judgment, tl ic 
affidavit showed that defendant could not read 
writing; that, when the summons and complaint 
were served on him, he consulted his friend and 
business partner as to what was necessary to be 
done, and, being incorrectly informed, let the case 
go by default; that defendant had a good defense to 
the action, and produced an answer that he desired 
to file. Held, that the default should be set aside, 
and the judgment vacated, 
*1 APPEAL from the Third Judicial District. 
"I he Respondent brought his action in the \\w\A 
District Court to recover the value of his inter*, -J I 
a certain lot of Railroad ties, of which the Apprh;-r: 
and he were joint owners, alleging that Appa l l -
had sold the ties and used the money Affef A • 
To set aside judgment by default and for leave to 
answer, the Appellant filed his motion in the Court 
below; which motion, after argument by Counsel 
and consideration by the Court, was overruled. To 
reverse the .-*rtinn . f t!u> Prmrt Helow this appeal is 
taken, 
Hempstead»V- Kit-kr>i u • L i] • * •, •.- f : , 11; 
-',
 v
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 s ondent. 
P.MLRSON J., delivered the opinion of the Court. 
L.rroi is assigned :;t this case upon five grounds, 
namely: 
I; i rs i ilu- • ' • ui i: ^ n cd in o verru 1 ing D efendant's 
motion, to set aside said judgment and till me 
proceedings thereunder, and open said default. 
5kXwnu, i m - i t \^u^ n u iCgal 01 VUI1U sc ! v i, _ 
summons upon the defendant in said action 
i::ii\.. baio dclauit anJ judgment were enkw 
vacation b> the Clerk without authority of law. 
Fou??th. Because the court h,uJ n*; _ir: OK\-
render judgment in said action, the ^anic K M»I-
soleh -oirni/ablc :r \ir :t' 
Fifth. Because the evidence on said motion 
established a case of mistake inadvertence and 
excusable neglect on the part of Defendant, and a 
m eritor i ous de fen ce. 
The facts set forth upon which the application was 
based do not show any neglect, excusable or 
otherwise, on the part of the Appellant; it was a 
misunderstanding or n listake as to what was 
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required of him. They do show, however, the very 
contrary of any negligence on the part of the 
appellant after being informed of the state of the 
case, and the real nature of the proceedings against 
him. 
The record discloses that as soon as his mistake 
was discovered, he was very prompt and persistent 
in his application to the Court for the relief which I 
think he ought to have had. 
The first and fifth assignments of error have 
reference to the refusal of the Court to set aside the 
judgment and default, and to permit the Defendant 
to answer. 
The granting or refusal of applications of this kind 
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, 
yet its power should be exercised freely and 
liberally, under the sections of the act permitting 
this to be done. 
The affidavit upon which this motion was based, 
shows clearly that the default and judgment were 
taken against the Appellant, by reason of his 
mistake as to the nature of the process served upon 
him. The Appellant can not read writing, and when 
the summons was served, he called upon his friend 
and former business partner to explain its nature 
and effect. The information he then received was 
incorrect, and very naturally, under the 
circumstances detailed in the affidavit, led him to 
believe that there was no necessity for his action in 
the matter. 
*2 The whole conduct of the Appellant, in 
reference to this matter, as evidenced by the record,, 
shows that he acted in the utmost good faith, and 
perfectly consistent with the representations made, 
and upon which the motion is based. His affidavit 
shows that he has a meritorious defence, and his 
application was accompanied by the answer which 
he proposed to file in the case. 
The answer contains matter, which if established 
upon trial would be a complete defence upon the 
merits, to the case made in the complaint. 
The further good faith of the Appellant is shown in 
the fact, which appears in the record, that at the 
hearing of the application he proposed to waive, 
and did waive, what he and his Counsel believed to 
be a valid objection to the service of the summons, 
thus showing that his only desire was to go to trial 
upon the merits of the case. 
While I would not ordinarily consent to interfere 
where the Court below has only exercised its 
discretionary power, I am satisfied that to refuse to 
do so in this case would result in a manner to 
impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. I 
think the case presented to the Court below, was 
such an one as called for its equitable interposition, 
such an interposition as is contemplated by the act, 
and that the application should have been granted. 
The conclusion to which I have come in reference 
to the first and fifth assignments of error, renders it 
unnecessary to enter into any extended examination 
of the other points raised in the record. 
So far as the second assignment is concerned, I am 
not prepared to say, but that the objection could be 
raised upon the appeal from the judgment, 
notwithstanding it was waived upon the motion to 
set aside the judgment and open the default. I 
understand that the obligation was waived after the 
judgment was taken by default for want of an 
appearance and answer, and for the purposes of the 
motion to set aside the judgment and default, and 
for that only. 
As the Appellant was not allowed to appear, there 
was no waiver on his part of any irregularity in the 
service of the summons, if there was any, by an 
appearance. 
I have very grave doubts of there being any validity 
in the objection itself. And as it will make no 
difference in the final determination of this case 
what my views are in regard to this point, I decline 
to express any opinion in regard to it, preferring to 
consider it in some case, if such an one shall arise, 
where it is a material point in the decision of the 
case. 
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Its determination would require an examination 
into the whole doctrine of de facto officers, and I 
prefer thai it should be after a more elaborate 
argument 'ruin was n^uk m ihi-. . .i ,-.• -HH ^ : \h ^ 
The third assignment of error denies the right of the 
Clerk to enter judgment on default in vacation. I am 
clearly of the opinion that in cases coming under the 
first subdivision of section 151 of the Practice Act, 
and where it does not require the proof of any fact, 
this may be done. 
*3 It has been so held in States where the whole 
judicial power is conferred upon the Courts in their 
fundamental law, and certainly the Organic Act of 
the Territory can not be, in this respect, a more 
sacred instrument than a State Constitution. That is 
to say, a. State Legislature is as much restrained 
from conferring this power upon the Clerk, under a 
State Constitution, conferring ail judicial power 
upon the Courts, as the Territorial Legislature is 
i inder the Organic Act 
The weight of authority is that in doing' this the 
Clerk acts tn inisterial ly and not j ud ic ially. 
I am also clearly of the opinion, that the case made 
by the complaint is not one in which the Clerk 
would be authorized to enter up judgment on 
default in vacation. 
I he action sounds in tort. It is for the conversion of 
certain railroad ties. The contract set up in the 
complaint does not furnish the measure of damages. 
The market value of the ties at the time of their 
conversion is the true measure of the Plaintiffs 
damages. The price for which they were sold is only 
evidence tending to show what that was. It required 
proof to establish what the market value was, and 
fix the amount for which the Plaintiff could recover. 
The Clerk had no power to take this proof. The 
judgment is therefor a nullity, but as it encumbers 
the record, the Appellant has a right to have it 
removed 
.: uu vv+:ff recovers at all he is entitled to 
" •• • •'<' tatc of the conversion onb a*wt <•-
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neither the complaint nor summons specifies the 
time from which interest is demanded, the Clerk 
could not enter judgment on default for the interest, 
as it would require proof to fix the time from which 
it should be 'reckoned. If the judgment were 
otherwise valid, however, this would simply be an. 
error which could be corrected by this Court on 
appeal. 
JUJL • *" •-* -"»** iU '•* -. .-unu bu; n 
does not show the necessar\ 
sworn memorai . . , . . . - . .,.,. v ] 'UXi '• * *> 
a specified amount of costs cntere 
Whatever \\c\\ MI.^ • r MM--, r.i i;.. JM ••: v 
recent discussion, there certainly can be no men1 w 
the foi nth - M gn n I en 11T erro r 
The judgment of the Court below in refusing to set 
aside the judgment and default, is reversed, and the 
judgment and default are set aside. The Appellant to 
be permitted to file his answer to the complaint, 
upon the payment by him of the taxable costs of the 
Plaintiff, up to, and including the judgment by 
default. 
Provided, That within two days after notice served 
upon the Attorney for the Respondent, of the filing 
of the remittitur from this Court, with the Clerk of 
the Third District Court the Respondent or his 
Attorney file with said Clerk of the Third District 
Court a sworn memoranda of the costs in that Court 
up to and including the judgment by default; if no 
such memoranda is filed within the time mentioned 
then the Appellant to have permission to file his 
answer. The Appellor- ~ \:--K \--: *!K- -:oslh i-'' ' 
appeal. 
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